Introduction
This article discusses aspects of Japanese business activities connected with Japanese military rule in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia. Earlier we have been involved in research on Japanese loans to China in the period from the Sino-Japanese War up to the Second World War (Kokka Shihon Yushutsu Kenkyukai 1986) . In the pre-war period the prevailing idea about Japanese international loans was that they were a state monopoly and dependent on Western capital markets, but during our research we discovered that there were many private Japanese companies and individuals engaged in the international loan business and that their main motive for doing so was to acquire concessions. In order to understand the historical dynamics of the Japanese economy and of economic interdependence in the East Asian region, we felt it would be rewarding to pay more attention to the international activities of private Japanese companies in relation to those of the government-owned enterprises and the zaibatsu. Because their activities were not limited to East Asia and their post-war return to Southeast Asia was earlier than their comeback in East Asia, we decided that their activities in Southeast Asia should be researched more intensively.
One of the main trends in recent research on Japan's economic history during the war period is focused on the macro-economic control system. Ando Yoshio, Hara Akira, Nakamura Takafusa and others have analysed the economic control procedures exercised through the allocation of foreign exchange and capital, and the mobilization programme for economic resources, Bussi Doin Keikaku, abbreviated to Butsudo Keikaku (Ando 1987; A. Hara 1995) . They also investigated both the planning stages and execution process of the 'Production Power Expansion Programme' (Seisanryoku Kakuju Keikaku), which was agreed upon by the first Konoe cabinet in January 1939, and the set-up of the 'New Economic System' (Keizai Shin Taisei). In the course of their investigations, these researchers uncovered some typical characteristics of the Japanese wartime economic control system. One of these was the heavy dependence on overseas trade, in other words, foreign exchange reserves and, after the outbreak of the Asia Pacific War, sea transportation. Another was the conflict between bureaucrats and business leaders regarding the management of the economy. Most recently, the younger members of the research group have been analysing the interaction between the economic control system and the market system, while more senior researchers have been concentrating on the business activities of private companies, according them the status of independent factors in the Japanese economic control system.
One of the general interests in historical research on big business has been the transformation of zaibatsu from family enterprises to big business groups. This has led to an insistence that governmental economic control and the rapid expansion of subsidiary companies producing munitions decisively reduced the ability of the holding companies to control the subsidiaries, and that the bigger subsidiaries seized the opportunity to begin the formation of their own groups (Shimotani 1990) . As the companies grew, management styles had to grow and change too in order to become more effective. Consequently, the parent companies were forced to transfer some functions to the subsidiaries. However, the degree of rigorous selfdissolution insisted upon by these writers is inconceivable, even given the extraordinary circumstances of a war economy.
Historical research on Japanese colonies and the occupied areas has been limited mainly to East Asia, especially Manchuria, North China, and Korea.
1 There are also some studies on the business activities of Japanese companies in these areas. State companies, including state banks, were the main instruments of Japanese economic control in the colonies. The roll call of these companies includes such names as Mantetsu (South Manchurian Railway Co., Ltd.), Toyo Takushoku (Oriental Development Co., Ltd.), Taiwan Ginko (Taiwan Bank), and Chosen Ginko (Korea Bank). Japan also set up many state companies in the occupied areas, of which the largest were Kitashina Kaihatsu (Northern China Development Co., Ltd.) and Nakashina Shinko (Central China Industrial Promoting Co., Ltd.). A few researchers have published books on such private companies as Nihon Sangyo (Nissan) and Nihon Chisso Hiryo (Nicchitsu: Nitrogenous Fertilizer Co., Ltd.) (Kwan 1985; Oshio 1989; Udagawa 1984) . Nissan expanded rapidly in the early 1930s and became the third largest zaibatsu in Japan, only to run into financial difficulties in the mid-1930s, after which it responded positively to the invitation of the Kwantung Army to start doing business in Manchuria. To meet this challenge it was reorganized into the Manshu Jukogyo Kaihatsu (Manchurian Heavy Industrial Development Co., Ltd.) in 1937, the core company in the Five Year Manchurian Industrial Development Programme. Nicchitsu was a leading electrochemical company, and, with the assistance of the Korean Government-General, it developed many power stations and established its main factories in northern Korea.
Though research on the economic history of Southeast Asia is still rare in Japan, we do have some important works. 2 Kobayashi Hideo has clarified the changes which occurred in Japan's system of economic rule in the colonies and occupied areas between the Manchurian Incident and the end of the Second World War. His research shows Japanese economic rule in the colonies was characterized by three stages: first the military invasion and occupation, then the reorganization of the monetary and commercial systems, and finally the exploitation of resources. In Manchuria, Japan did succeed to some extent, but in Mainland China and Southeast Asia, it was never able to achieve real military and political stability. This is a cogent indication that the second and third stages of Japanese colonial rule encountered enormous difficulties in these two areas.
The inroads made by Japanese companies shifted from the setting up of monopolistic state companies in each industrial sector, to the establishment of state holding companies and their subsidiaries. This move attracted investment from large private companies and led to their direct participation. Besides business studies, there are some other important works on such topics as the migration of Japanese citizens in the pre-war period and the transformation of rural societies under Japanese military occupation. 3 Last year we published a collective work dealing mainly with the business activities of Japanese companies in Southeast Asia during the war (Hikita 1995) . Table 1 estimates the assets of Japanese companies outside Japan proper. It clearly shows that Japan concentrated its foreign investment in Manchuria, Korea, and northern China. Investments in the Southern Areas amounted to 17,567 thousand yen (only 5.3% of the total), and in the Army and Otsu (Thailand and French Indo-China) areas, including the main parts of Indonesia, it was 4.9% of total investments outside Japan proper.
Japanese investment in Southeast Asia
In the breakdown by sector, it is clear that the Southern Areas (column D) had higher ratios than other investment areas (column G) in trading and agriculture, and a very low ratio in transportation. The high percentage in transportation was due to the railway assets in Manchuria, Korea, and Taiwan, especially those of the South Manchurian Railway Co. It was a common characteristic of Japanese colonial investment that the manufacturing industries received the highest priority. Table 2 gives an overview of Japanese 'investments' in the Southern Areas classified by area and economic sector. 4 The table shows that 63% of Japanese capital went into regions controlled by the Army and 28% into regions occupied by the Navy. Within the Army-controlled regions the proportion accorded to Malaya was the largest, 25%, of which 43% of the total went into manufacturing, and 33% into mining.
The Indonesian Archipelago was divided into Army areas (Sumatra and Java) and Navy areas (Celebes, Southern Borneo, and others), and investments here amounted to about 30% of the total Japanese investment in the Southern Areas. These percentages show that within the Southern Areas, Japan invested most heavily in the former Dutch colony. Investment in Indonesia as a whole was characterized by a relatively high percentage put into agriculture and farming (12.1%). Because Indonesia comprised diverse economies spread throughout its constituent islands, the breakdown by sector of Japanese investment varied widely.
In Java (8.2% of the total), Japan concentrated its investments in manufacturing: about 60% of the overall Java total. Investment in Sumatra (6.2% of the total) was spread over three sectors: agriculture and farming (29.4% of the Sumatra total), manufacturing (27.6%), and mining (21.6%); Celebes (6.3% of the total of Indonesia) also had three targeted sectors: manufacturing (22.6%), transportation and communications (22.2%), and facilities (21.4%). Borneo (6.4% of the total) had heavy investments in mining (44.6% of the Borneo total). The Lesser Sunda Islands and Ambon and Halmahera had only very small proportions of the total, 0.22% and 0.35% each. Here the main investment sectors were trading (53.7% of the Lesser Sunda Islands total) and fisheries (86.1% of the Ambon and Halmahera total).
Which companies invested in the Southern Areas? Table 3 was compiled from a list of companies that established a foothold in the Army areas and from reports by companies that were active in the Navy areas. These 4 There are two problems inherent in this table. One is that these figures have probably been underestimated. We can assume that the Bureau of Foreign Affairs had simply made a summary of the figures presented by the offices of the companies or by their agents in Japan proper. With the defeat of Japan and the ensuing confusion, many of the offices could not obtain their real financial figures, and some were unable to supply the Bureau with information. The confusion was compounded in late 1944, when the Japanese Navy nationalized the assets of almost all private companies located in the Maluku Archipelago, New Guinea, and the neighbouring areas, in order to compensate for their losses caused by the attack of the Allied Forces. Dai 4 Nanken Kantai Sireichokan (Chief Commander of No.4 Fleet dispatched to the Southern Areas), 'Minkan jigyo kan'ei tenkan no ken hokoku' [A report to the Minister of the Navy concerning the transfer of the private business to the government], 1945.3.1, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, E.0.0.0.3-1. The other problem is that the word 'investment' in this table has a somewhat wider meaning than its usual usage, because it includes the running costs. Despite these limitations, the table serves as a basis to compare the relative investment portions. documents give data for 215 companies, of which 142 operated in Army areas, and 73 in Navy areas. The orders placed by the military authorities amounted to a total of 1,538, of which 1,270 were at the behest of the Army, and 268 of the Navy. 5 As Table 3 shows, 726 orders, or 47.2% of the total, concerned business in Indonesia. This figure, as well as the data in Table 2 , plainly reveals that for wartime Japan Indonesia was clearly the most important area in the Southern Areas. Table 3 also shows that the big businesses (zaibatsu and others) played a central role in the Indonesian economy under the Japanese occupation. They received 69.3% of all orders: the zaibatsu 45.8%, and other big companies 23.4%.
It is possible to be even more precise. The role of big businesses was larger in the Army areas than in the Navy areas. In the Army-controlled territories zaibatsu dominated the agricultural and trading sectors and were just as important as other large companies in manufacturing. In the Navy areas, the role of state companies and local companies was much larger. In the main, Japan's economic rule in Indonesia depended on private big businesses. These businesses were active in the industries most vital to the Japanese war economy, such as mining, manufacturing, and trading.
The selection of companies as 'developers' of the Southern Areas
On 11 December 1941, the Kikaku-in Dai 6 Iinkai (the No. 6 Committee of the Planning Board) decided upon the Nanpo Keizai Taisaku Yoko (Main Principles for Economic Measures in the Southern Areas), and the Kankei Kakuryo Kaigi (Relevant Ministers Conference) ratified them the next day. This decision formed the basis for Japanese economic rule in the areas thereafter. The document explained the aims of these measures as follows: 'to contribute to the war effort by developing important resources and building up the self-sufficiency of the Japanese empire'. These measures were to be applied to both the Ko (Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, Burma, British Malaya, Borneo, and others) and the Otsu (French IndoChina and Thailand) areas. The Planning Board attached particular importance to the production of petroleum, and insisted that the Army and Navy, with the assistance of Japanese petroleum companies, expand this in the first stage. Turning to other mineral resources, the Planning Board emphasized the production of nickel, copper, bauxite, chrome, manganese, mica, phosphate, metals necessary for special steel manufacturing, and the nonferrous metals without tin. It formulated the selection criteria in its search for companies to develop these resources as follows: 1 A resource in one particular region should be developed by a single company; 2 the companies must have sufficient experience of similar business either in the districts allotted them or elsewhere; 3 they should have the necessary capacity; 4 as a rule, two or more companies should take part in the development of the same resources throughout the entire sweep of the Southern Areas; 5 newcomers in the sectors of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries should be curbed; 6 the government has no intention of promoting manufacturing in the areas, with the exception of shipbuilding and the repair of equipment needed for development.
According to these criteria, the companies had to be big businesses or middle-range local ones.
Having established its priorities, the No. 6 Committee and, after the organization of the Ministry of Great East Asia, the Renraku Iinkai Dai 1 Bukai (First Section of the Liaison Committee) of the Ministry, decided in rapid succession which companies would engage in these activities. Thereupon the Army or Navy, Tokyo or the local agencies, issued the orders. Almost all of the enterprises appointed were involved in the processing of agricultural products and refining of ore, including the management of the important requisitioned factories.
On 29 May 1943, the First Section of the Liaison Committee decided on the Nanpo Ko Chiiki Keizai Taisaku Yoko (Main Principles for Economic Measures in the Southern Ko Areas). Threatened by the increasing loss of convoys, the Japanese government wanted to build up a self-sufficient economy in each occupied area, not merely to ensure the well-being of the Japanese troops but also that of the native inhabitants. In the light of this change of policy, the committee altered the policy restraining manufacturing in the Southern Areas as follows:
1 Japanese authorities should promote local manufacturing industries judged to be crucial, after giving due consideration to transportation capacity, resources, materials, labour, fuel, power, equipment, and other factors; 2 the industries should include the production of everyday requirements, especially textiles, for the sake of self-sufficiency; 3 Japanese middle and small-scale manufacturers should be utilized in suitable industries. Table 4 gives a chronological list of the companies selected as 'developers' for the Japanese war effort. It should be noted that some companies came into the possession of important 'enemy' assets through special connections with the Japanese military authorities. A typical example is Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Co., which had been granted the big shipyard in Singapore by the Navy even before the Japanese attacked the city (Muramatsu 1956:317-20) . These cases are not included in this table.
The first group of companies selected by the committee were the mining firms. This decision was made as early as three weeks after the outbreak of the Asia Pacific War. In the case of mining, the committee made its selection on the recommendation of the Kozan Toseikai, the Mining Control Association. 6 This Toseikai, simultaneously, proposed a selection procedure for development companies.
7 This provided for the committee to decide on the persons in charge of the site and the companies that would cooperate with them. These companies were Mitsui Mining, Mitsubishi Mining, Nihon Mining, Ishihara Sangyo, Furukawa Mining, Japan Steel Pipe Mining, Iidzuka Iron Ore, Nissan Shokai, and Celebes Kogyo. These nine companies took nineteen orders, of which eleven involved the reopening of the mines that the same companies had run before the war until the freezing of Japanese assets. The others were to manage enemy assets.
The selection of mining developers occurred somewhat earlier than that of other developers. The committee selected half of them before August 1942, whereas most of the manufacturers were chosen only after the summer of 1942. The process of selection reached its peak in the summer of 1942 according to Table 4 . From July to September of that year, the committee decided upon 359 projects, that is 42% of the total of 849 projects. The second peak was reached in the fourth quarter of the 1942 Japanese fiscal year, when the number amounted to 171, or 20% of the total.
Those companies selected were very active in winning orders for the different development projects. On 31 January 1942, the General Affairs Department of the Planning Board made a list of companies that desired to establish a foothold in the Southern Areas.
8 There were thirty-three companies on the list, and some of them were competing for the same concessions, for example the bauxite mines on Bintang and in Johor, the aluminium refining plant in Sumatra, and the manganese mines in the Philippines.
Bauxite was one of the most vital resources for Japanese military production. copper wire and electrical cables in Japan, and one of the main subsidiaries of Furukawa zaibatsu, explored the bauxite resources in Southeast Asia in preparation for entering the aluminium industry and securing a reliable aluminium supply for cables and the manufacture of aluminium alloys such as duralumin. The FEI located some promising mines in the Riau Archipelago and then applied to the British government of Malaya and the Dutch government of the East Indies for mining concessions. They were doomed to disappointment, since both the British government and Dutch government refused to grant their permission. The reason given by the former was that it was a militarized zone, and the Dutch government gave the concessions to the Belitung Co., with which Furukawa had negotiated earlier. This company won the monopoly to export to the Japanese empire. Having won the concession, the Belitung Co. set up the NederlandschIndische Bauxiet Mijnbouw Maatschappij (NIBEM) to carry out its bauxite mining business, and the NIBEM began to export to Japan through the Japan Aluminium Syndicate, and later through the Dutch Japan Trading Co., a subsidiary of the Furukawa zaibatsu. In 1935, using this resource and with the support of the Navy and the GovernmentGeneral of Taiwan, Furukawa set up an aluminium refining company in Taiwan, Japan Aluminium Co., in conjunction with Mitsubishi and Mitsui. So well before 1941, Furakawa was well-established in the bauxite mining and aluminium refining industries in the Southern Areas.
Similarly, Ishihara Sangyo Kaiun Co. Ltd. acquired some bauxite mines in Batu Pahat of Johor State, Malaya. Mitsui Mine Co., Ltd. had been running the Palau bauxite mine since 1938.
The Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (MBK), the largest trading company in Japan and at that time the holding company of the Mitsui zaibatsu, submitted an application for managing the Bintang mine, citing its previous achievements in bauxite mining in Palau. In this case, taking account of previous achievements on Bintang, the Furukawa Mining Co. Ltd. (FMC) was selected as the developer on 19 February 1942. The MBK also wanted to acquire the aluminium refining business in Sumatra, for which the Nihon Keikinzoku (Japan Light Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd., JLM) was also in the running. The JLM was set up in 1939 as a joint venture of the FEI and the Tokyo Dento Co., Ltd. (Tokyo Electric Light, one of the biggest electrical power companies in Japan). The Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Planning Board gave the JLM pride of place as the leading aluminium manufacturer in the Producing Power Expanding Programme of Japan, Manchuria, and China, and informally supported the establishment and construction of its main factories (Hikita 1979) . The FEI, as mentioned above, had built up a very intimate connection with the NIBEM and had been fully informed about the aluminium refining project in Sumatra which the NIBEM had been planning with Neuhausen of Switzerland before the outbreak of the Pacific War.
9 Thus, the JLM, in reality the FEI, was very highly regarded in the Japanese policy promoting the light metal industry and had access to crucial information regarding the plan. Faced with this sort of competition the MBK had to relinquish this concession as well.
The aluminium refining project in Sumatra was linked to the hydroelectric power development of the Asahan River and the bauxite mine on Bintang. A newcomer, the Nicchitsu (Nihon Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufacturing Co., Ltd.), also became involved in this project. The Nicchitsu had had experience developing many hydro-electric power plants in northern Korea, securing itself a niche as one of the largest companies in the Japanese electrochemical industry involved in the construction of power plants and electrical refining processes.
As these examples show, the Japanese occupation of the Southern Areas triggered off a chain of liquidations among Japanese big businesses in these territories. They were forced to compete fiercely with each other to obtain the more profitable concessions in these areas during and after the war. Despite confident bids, most of the challengers failed. Any advantages they may have had were outweighed by the 'previous achievements' of their rivals. Table 5 shows the trading links between Japan proper and the occupied Southern Areas (5-A), the exports from Indonesia to Japan (5-B), and the imports into Indonesia from Japan (5-C). The trading links in this table refer to the agencies, the relations between the main and branch offices within the same companies, and the parent and subsidiary relations of the members of the same group, that were organized to facilitate the trading.
The trading network between Japan proper and the Southern Areas
The traders had to sell the goods they had amassed to the Rinji Gunjihi Tokubetsu Kaikei (Special War Accounts) at the port of export, and to buy them from the accounts office at the port of import. The special war accounts covered the shipping risks and the disparity in price levels.
The Southern Areas were rich in many medium-scale and local companies. 10 Half of them were connected to the control agencies, and a 9 Ueshima Seizo, 'Senji-chu no Bintang bauxite kozan kaihatsu' [The development of Bintang bauxite in the war period], a memorandum from Ueshima for the editing of the history of the FEI. Ueshima had been active in the foreign business of the Furukawa zaibatsu, especially the FEI. He was promoted to director of the FEI in 1937, and assumed the senior managing directorship of the Japan Dutch Trading Co. and a directorship of Toho Kinzoku Seiren (Toho Metal Refining Co.) in 1938, and the executive directorship of the JLM in 1939. After the outbreak of the war, he took up the position of manager-in-chief of the Southern business of the FMC, the mother company of Furukana zaibatsu. 10 'Local companies' refers to companies which had their main office in Southeast Asia and were not subsidiaries of big business.
quarter of them were involved in import from Japan through the Koeki Eidan, the largest control agency in trading. Most of the remaining ones were linked to each other. The large companies traded through the control agencies, and between branches and main offices. For example, the ratio of inner trading was over 60% in the zaibatsu companies. The control agencies formed the core of the Japanese trading network between Japan and the Southern Areas, and the sub-core consisted of the zaibatsu companies. This network was connected to local distributing or purchasing networks in each area. Chinese merchants and others were, formally or informally, subsumed into these networks."
In the commercial links between Japan and Indonesia, 63 companies were engaged in exports from Indonesia, and 241 companies in imports. These 304 companies comprised 44% of the total number of trading firms in the Southern Areas. The import commodities were fairly varied and the number of import items, as indicated by the variety on offer, was four times larger than that of exports. Imports included textiles (cotton, artificial silk, hemp, and wool), manufactured rubber goods, chemical products, machines, metal products, bicycles, motor cars, foods, and other miscellaneous products. Most of the export goods consisted of agricultural and forestry products: oil seeds, copra, palm oil, sugars (including the ingredients for alcohol 12 ), resins, kapok, materials for medicines (quina and delis), rubber, lumber and so forth.
Only a few local traders were engaged in the export business. They were the Yukimoto Shoten and the Borneo Bussan Shokai, both prominent exporters of timber. 13 On the import side, there were nine local traders including Daishin Yoko, the SGK Shinko Gomei, and the Sakurai Shoten. Daishin Yoko received 41 orders, the SGK Shinko Gomei ten, and the Sakurai Shoten seven. These trading companies had been engaged in importing from Japan for about twenty years before the outbreak of the war, and had built up extensive branch networks throughout Indonesia and neighbouring areas. Table 5 -D shows the volume of Japanese trade with the Southern Areas during the war. The commodities which the Japanese imported from the Southern Areas consisted of foodstuffs, medicines, ores, oils and fats, hides and skins, tin, hemp and other products. Almost all the imported foodstuffs came from the Otsu areas, especially from French Indo-China. In the occupied areas Japan exploited ores, oils and fats, hides and skins, metals, and hemp. The Japanese exports to the Southern Areas consisted of textiles, machines, medicines, papers, metals, and some other products. The textiles were very important as they earned the money to purchase the vital agricultural resources. The machines were exported to the occupied areas in order to develop the resources in the first phase of the occupation and to build up some manufacturing industries, namely shipbuilding, spinning, weaving, and smelting, in the later phase.
In 1942 Japan allotted about 90% of its southern exports to Otsu areas, compared to 10% to the occupied areas. The ratio gradually reversed in the next few years. The weight of the occupied areas increased to 40% in 1943, 82% in 1944 and 68% in 1945 . The imports from the occupied areas overtook those from the Otsu areas: 10% in 1942 10% in , 61% in 1943 10% in , 86% in 1944 10% in , and 99% in 1945 10% in (Shibata 1995 .
Some aspects of Japanese business activities during the war
The dearth of documents makes it difficult to analyse the actual activities of Japanese companies in the Southern Areas. However, through a close reading of the official reports and the company histories of the zaibatsu it is still possible to get a glimpse of the wartime business conducted by Japanese enterprises. In this section therefore, I would like to focus on the activities of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu and some other large companies.
Mitsubishi was founded by Iwasaki Yataro soon after the Meiji Restoration, at which time its main business was shipping. Once established, Mitsubishi grew rapidly through the patronage of Okubo Toshimichi and Okuma Shigenobu, leaders of the Japanese government in the early Meiji era. By the end of the First World War, Mitsubishi had become the second largest zaibatsu in Japan. During the Second World War, it lost no time in enlarging the scale of its operations again. It had built up a pyramid of controlling subsidiary companies with the Mitsubishi Co., Ltd. at the top. Mitsubishi Co. announced the list of its members in December 1944 (Mitsubishi Shashi 1981 Shashi , vol. 39:2317 . They were classified into four groups, the main group being the Bunkei Kaisha. The members of this category had become differentiated from the mother company, and comprised eleven companies: heavy industries, warehousing, trading, mining, banking, electrical manufacturing, trusts, estates, oil, chemical industries, and steel manufacturing. The second group was the Kankei Kaisha, in which the holding company and the Bunkei Kaisha invested jointly. The third was the Bokei Kaisha, the subsidiary company of the Bunkei Kaisha. The last group was the Enko Kaisha, in which members of the Iwasaki family invested. The total number of these companies was eighty-five, and the sum of their paid-up capital amounted to 1,868 million yen. But these were not all the irons Mitsubishi had in the fire; it had other important subsidiary companies, such as Nihon Yusen, the Kirin Beer Brewery, Fuji Gas Spinning, to name just a few. Table 6 -A shows that among the members of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu the Tozan Industrial Co., Ltd. received the largest number of orders from the military authorities. This company was set up on 15 April 1944, and fell heir to the Southern business orders of the Tozan Noji Co., Ltd. and the Tonan Industrial Co., Ltd. (Mitsubishi Shashi 1981 Shashi , vol. 39:2257 . It was classified as part of the Enko Kaisha, but it was entrusted to the Mitsubishi Trading Company Ltd. (MTC), as well as its predecessors. Beside these two companies, several other Mitsubishi companies, such as the Tawao Estate Ltd., Consolidated Sangyo Koshi, and the Boeton Industrial Co., Ltd., were active in the Southern Areas. The Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha, a holding company before its reorganization into a joint-stock company, managed these enterprises initially, but gradually transferred them to the MTC, making the MTC in effect the pivot of Mitsubishi's Southern businesses. This was also the case with the Mitsui zaibatsu in which the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (Mitsui Trading Co., MBK) became the core company of Mitsui's wartime enterprises in the Southern Areas.
In September 1941, the MTC received a secret order from the military authorities directing it to formulate economic measures for the Southern Areas. In response it set up the Nanpo Chosa Kai, an investigating committee for the Southern Areas, in its main office. Since May of that year, the MTC had already been secretly repatriating its staff members from branches in Europe and America, as well as from those in the colonies. These employees were recruited on to the committee, engaging themselves in investigation, planning, and the writing of reports (Mitsubishi 1986:561) . Cannily the MTC delivered these investigation reports not only to the military authorities, but also made sure they reached the ministries concerned and other interested institutions. Then, on 26 December 1941, the MTC set up the Nanpo-ka (Southern Department) in its main office, followed on 26 March 1942 by the Sangyo-bu (Industrial Division), specifically to manage the industrial development businesses in the Southern Areas. The Mitsubishi Co. also organized the Nanpo Renraku Kai, a liaison conference covering the eleven Bunkei companies on 6 February 1942, and appointed the MTC as its secretary (Mitsubishi Shashi 1981 Shashi , vol. 38:1912 . These preparations by Mitsubishi, and other zaibatsu, to gird themselves for an advance into the Southern Areas were part of the preliminary preparations for the planned Japanese military operation.
In April 1942, the military authorities began to issue orders to private companies to take part in the development of the occupied Southern Areas. In late April or early May, Mitsubishi dispatched 85 staff members to take part in this strategy. Mitsubishi recruited these employees from subsidiary companies such as Trading, Banking, Tawao Industrial, Mining, Tozan Noji, Tonan Industrial, Fuji Gas Spinning, Japan Chemical Industries, and Sango Koshi. They never arrived as their ship was sunk in a torpedo attack on 8 May, and fifty-five Mitsubishi men perished. Though these deaths were a heavy loss, Mitsubishi continued to dispatch staff members to the Southern Areas, and by mid-1943 their number amounted to some 1600 (Mitsubishi Shashi, vol. 38:1932) .
As the organization of the Nanpo Renraku Kai shows, the Mitsubishi Company not only held the majority of stocks in the subsidiary companies, it also played the role of coordinator throughout the entire zaibatsu. This function in the southern business of Mitsubishi was delegated to the MTC.
The MTC was engaged in various businesses in the Southern Areas including trading, plantations, farming, forestry, and manufacturing (Mitsubishi 1958:895-906) . This is shown in the following outline. (Mitsubishi 1958 (Mitsubishi :910-912,1986 . 14 Just before the war the MTC had 87 foreign branches, of which 40 were located in China and 12 in Southeast Asia. This number had increased to 131 by the end of war: 56 branches in China and 62 in Southeast Asia (Mitsubishi 1986:576) . The number of branches in Southeast Asia increased in French Indo-China, Thailand, and the Netherlands East Indies before the war, then with the freezing of Japanese assets, decreased in the Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya. After the outbreak of the war, their number once again took off. The rapid growth in orders, especially of development and local purchasing or distributing, necessitated the building up of far denser branch networks than had been required for international trading in the pre-war period.
As Table 6 -B shows, the Mitsubishi businesses with orders in Indonesia were mainly concerned with agriculture. A comparison with other companies shows this was a special characteristic of Mitsubishi zaibatsu, due to its absorption of the Tozan Industrial Co., Ltd., which had been entrusted to the MTC. In its approach to plantations and farming, the MTC adopted two types of management; one suited to plantations or estates, and the other based on a cultivation contract. The former included the expansion and management of enemy assets. The largest and second largest consignments were the products of tapioca and sisal plantations in Kediri (Java). The MTC supplied the staff for the cultivation and office work, and Nihon Cereal Industries (one of the Kankei Kaisha) the staff for the processing (Mitsubishi 1958 (Mitsubishi :899, 1986 . Most of the employees were probably recruited from among those who had already been working there.
The Navy ordered the MTC to cultivate cotton in southern Celebes (2,270 hectares) and eastern Bali (2,310 hectares). Mitsubishi preferred to make contracts with indigenous farmers through local chiefs, because cotton had never been cultivated there before. This plan failed entirely. The damage caused by insects was very serious, and subsequently the Navy gave priority to food production (Mitsubishi 1958:897-912) . The damages incurred by the farmers were not recorded. The Navy ordered vegetable cultivation in East Java, for the first time in April 1942, and afterwards extended the orders to various other places. MTC opened some plantations and embarked on purchasing vegetables from the local farmers. This project went relatively well, and the supply of vegetables to the Navy increased rapidly (Mitsubishi 1958:899-900) .
Leather products were an important military asset, but Japan found itself unable to produce sufficient hides at home. Faced with a shortage, the military authorities were eager to secure hides from the Southern Areas. The MTC was active in purchasing them in the Philippines, the Navy areas of Indonesia, and above all in Burma. Mitsubishi delivered the hides collected to the Teikoku Leather and Showa Shoe Manufacturing for processing. The military authorities ordered these two companies to expand their production capacity, but they were then suffering from a lack of capital. Filling the breach, Mitsubishi invested in them and acquired the right of sole agency (Mitsubishi 1958:901-2) . This provides a good example of Mitsubishi's wartime expansion.
Of all the islands in the Indonesian Archipelago, Java was a relatively well-industrialized area. There were some important manufacturing firms in Surabaya, Bandung, Jakarta, and some other cities. Mitsubishi Electric was allotted three concessions in Java in the shape of machine factories in Jakarta, Bandung, and Semarang. Their importance was not highly rated, as is shown by the fact that Mitsubishi dispatched only nine staff members in June 1943 (Mitsubishi 1958:911) .
This contrasted sharply with the fact that the Army entrusted some of the well-equipped Philips factories in Surabaya to the Tokyo Shibaura Electric Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (Toshiba). Toshiba was a company in which both Mitsui and General Electric of the USA invested, and it had the best electrical technology in Japan at the time. The Japanese government compelled Toshiba to provide the patents and know-how, especially that for electron tubes, to the other major electric manufacturing companies, such as the Nippon Electric Company and Hitachi, in order to step up the production of radio weapons as quickly as possible (Yoshida 1990) . The terms of the consignment of the factory in Surabaya imposed the condition that Toshiba should share the technology of Philips with other manufacturers.
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One of the most actively promoted industries was shipbuilding, especially that section involved in production of wooden and motorized sailing boats, in order to cover the shortage of motorized boats in the occupied Southern Areas. In November 1942, the Japanese Southern Army decided on the plan of building 500 thousand-ton wooden boats, a plan carried out in all districts, not only in the Army areas, but also in the Navy and Otsu areas (Defence Agency 1985:418). Various companies participated in this project, the larger being zaibatsu like Mitsui and Mitsubishi, the smaller members being the Borneo Zosenjo Keiei Kumiai (Borneo Shipyard Managing Association), Ondo Zosen, Shimaki Zosenjo and some others. The MTC opened twelve shipyards in Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, and Burma, and the MBK opened eighteen in Indo-China, the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, northern Borneo, Sumatra, and Java. At first, the MBK simply bought the boats from local shipbuilders, but it later opened its own shipyards. In the Jakarta shipyard, the MBK was building suicide speed boats to be used in an offensive against the landing operations of the Allied Forces. There was only one Japanese shipwright instructing about 500 indigenous workers how to build them (Suzuki and Hanai 1995:399-402) . Generally the shipyards producing these wooden boats employed several hundred indigenous labourers each and caused serious depredations on the forests. A chronic shortage of engines made it impossible to produce motorized sailing boats.
In any survey of the business activities of Japanese companies in the Southern Areas, it must be pointed out that they had investigated local resources enthusiastically. In fact, they had been collecting pertinent information long before the outbreak of the war. After the Manchurian incident, Japanese heavy industry grew rapidly, making it even more hungry for raw materials. But in the 1930s especially, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia were extremely wary of permitting on-the-spot investigations. Nomura Mining, for instance, had applied for an exploration permit in 1938 in order to develop bauxite mining in British Malaya. The colonial government refused to authorize it because the area concerned was near or in the militarized zone. 16 The Japanese occupation of these areas swept away these barriers. The Japanese government lost no time in drawing up exploration plans for the Southern Areas. In June 1941, it decided to dispatch an investigation commission to French Indo-China. It proved to be the first of many (Hikita 1992:18-21) . In the Philippines, the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army asked Mitsubishi to send economic research staff, in response to which Mitsubishi recruited personnel from its subsidiary companies. They were incorporated into the Firipine Gunsei Kanbu Hito Chosa-bu (Philippines Research Division of Military Administration) and remained active until the end of war (Mitsubishi Shashi 1981 Shashi , vol. 38:1956 . Table 4 includes twelve on-thespot investigations for the industrialization of resources based on former research. This is evidence that the Japanese government, research institutes, and companies had all previously collected data on the economic and natural resources in the Southern Areas.
Having given an outline of their establishment, we should consider the profitability of Japanese southern businesses in wartime. This is a difficult task because the Japanese government extracted the accounts from those of the companies concerned, and integrated them into the Special Accounts of War, documents which are not yet declassified. Despite this obstacle, it is still possible to make a partial attempt to analyse this on the basis of the fragmentary data that are available. Table 7 shows the sum of the turnover and gross profits of the MBK from October 1939 to March 1945. In this period, the ratio of profit to the sum of business conducted declined after October 1942. The initially profitable returns of the branches in the Southern Areas became deficits. In the most important areas under the Japanese military administration, such as the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya, the losses were very heavy. The MBK enlarged its branches in these areas, but the personnel expenses and the costs of new businesses increased rapidly (Suzuki and Hanai 1995:415-31) . In contrast, the branches in the Otsu areas (Thailand and French Indo-China) did relatively well. As the Japanese authorities did not strictly control the Japanese companies in these areas, the latter had some room for free trading activities. In Indo-China, however, the French Government-General repressed the business activities of Japanese companies. For example, because the Bank of Indo-China refused to exchange yen for piaster, the MTC borrowed the yen from the Nanpo Kaihatsu Kinko (Southern Development Bank) in Japan proper and incorporated 16 the amount into the Navy budget, then received its piaster money through the Japanese Navy account in Indo-China (Mitsubishi 1986:589-91) . The evidence indicates that the MBK may have done better than the MTC in Indo-China because the sum of its turnover was the largest among its branches in the Southern Areas. Table 8 is a summary of the balance sheets of 179 Japanese companies in Java, classified by profit rates. These data come from official documents handed over by the Japanese military administration to the Allied Forces after the war.
The table shows that more than half of the Japanese companies in Java had made profits during the wartime period. However when we compare the profits of the companies in the upper half of the table to the losses of the companies in the lower half, we find that overall losses exceeded profits by 38.6%.
The profitability of the divisions within zaibatsu, like Mitsui and Mitsubishi, differed widely. The business of the Mitsubishi Trading Co. (MTC) recorded in the document showed profit rates for trading (4.1%), estates (20.3%), and shipbuilding (0.5%). The average profit rate of all business sections within the MTC was 4.4%. Of the other subsidiaries of the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, the profitable ones were Mitsubishi Papermills (16.9%), Mitsubishi Electric Manufacturing (7%), Mitsubishi Fats and Oils (13.9%), and Kirin Beer (4.4%). Losses were recorded by the Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance Co. (-20.8%), and Tozan Industrial (-16.3%).
Mitsui Bussan Kaisha (MBK) had two divisions recorded in the above mentioned documents. The trading division showed an overall profit of 18.8%, while shipbuilding showed a loss of -1.7%. Other profitable divisions of Mitsui zaibatsu were Nankoku Industrial (4.3%), Toyo Cotton Flower (4.2%), Mitsui Agriculture and Forestry (0.7%), and Mitsui Chemical (0.1%). The unprofitable ones were Toshiba (-19.1%) and Mitsui Mine (-0.7%).
Of the other large Japanese companies mentioned in the documents, the following were quite profitable: Hitachi Seisakusho (profit rate 30%), Kawasaki Zoki (4.4%), Taiwan Takushoku (2.1%). The companies that had extremely heavy losses were: Nomura (-15%), Bayah Coal Mine (-26.4%), Hayashikane (-44.9%), Nihon Chisso (-3.5%), and Ishihara (-2.6%).
These figures show that for many Japanese companies their wartime businesses in the Southern areas were hardly profitable. One can therefore conclude that their central aim in making inroads into these areas may have been to get concessions for their post-war businesses.
Conclusions
We have discussed the wartime business activities of Japanese companies in Southeast Asia. Let me summarize the findings. First, Japan invested most heavily in Indonesia, and the breakdown by sector varied widely per island. Second, the leading investors were big businesses, both the zaibatsu and others. They competed with each other to win important concessions, but their previous achievements and a special relationship with the Japanese military authorities usually settled these contests. Medium-scale and local companies won only a small portion of the battle for concessions, and were integrated into the controlled trading system. Third, the Mitsubishi Co. coordinated its subsidiaries for its wartime businesses, and the MTC, as well as the MBK in Mitsui, occupied the pivotal positions in their various Southern businesses, in both the zaibatsu companies and in the all-Japanese companies. Fourth, the profitability of the wartime Southern businesses was not as high as had been expected and declined rapidly, especially in the areas under Japanese military administration. Fifth, the Japanese government and the companies themselves investigated the resources of the areas intensively, and accumulated a wealth of data. Though they planned to utilize these immediately for the war effort, the circumstances were against them and they had to abandon many of their attempts. These investigations in fact turned out to be more 'useful' in the post-war period, especially in the first stage of Japan's rapid economic growth.
The Peace Treaty signed in San Francisco obliged the Japanese government to pay indemnity for its military invasions. Accepting this, it began to negotiate the conditions with the governments concerned, but it used the indemnities as means to promote Japanese heavy industries. Japanese economic cooperation programmes and official development assistance (ODA) later adopted this same strategy. Japanese indemnities and development aid were tied up with the export of equipment and sometimes whole plants from Japan. Consultant agencies, like Nihon Koei Co., Ltd., usually designed these programmes at least in part on the basis of the knowledge derived from wartime investigations. The Nihon Koei was set up by Kubota Yutaka, who had been a staff member of Nicchitsu and had been engaged in the investigation and development of Asahan hydro-electric power and of the use of electricity for aluminium refining in Sumatra. The company has taken part in many Japanese indemnities and ODA programmes since the development of hydro-electric power in Burma, the first Japanese indemnity (Nihon Koei Co., Ltd. 1987; Nagatsuguka 1966; Sumi 1989) . Besides the personal relationship built up between the Japanese and the indigenous people and the Overseas Chinese, the Japanese economic invasion under military rule produced an embryonic reflection of the post-war period. 'Otsu' areas: Thailand and French Indo-China. **• Indonesia: Java, Sumatra, Celebes, Borneo, Lesser Sunda Islands, Maluku Islands, New Guinea. •i a !S
• We have classified the companies both by 'Keiretsu* and by the sum of the paid-up capital. Over ten million yen = big companies, S' under ten million yen = middle and small scale, and those which had their main business areas in Southeast Asia = local. The subsidiary of © each company is classified in the categories to which the parent company belongs. a. Source: 'Nanpo rikugun chiku shinshutsu kigyo kaisha ichiran' [A list of companies advanced to the Southern Army areas] and 'Nanpo _. ni okeru shigen kaihatsu jigyo shinchoku jokyo shirabe' [A survey of the exploitation process of Southern resources]. Both documents g are reserved in the Archives of Foreign Affairs, E.2.2.1.3-40 and E.0.0.0.8-1.
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